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Introduction
Negative campaigning has become an increasingly common feature of electoral contests in the US, with the recent presidential campaigns of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney offering the latest examples. While political scientists have extensively studied the general effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes, 1 the literature focusing specifically on the impact of negative campaign spending (used for critical advertising) is more limited. This literature contains both theoretical and empirical contributions, with economists contributing significantly to the theoretical component.
One strand of the theoretical literature analyzes negative campaigning using a spatial median-voter model in the tradition of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) . Under this approach, initiated by Harrington and Hess (1996) and extended by Chakrabarti (2007) , a candidate's negative campaign spending serves to push the perceived policy position of the opponent toward a more-extreme location, shifting votes toward the candidate. "Positive" campaign spending by the opponent attempts to offset this effect, preventing the loss of votes. The purpose of the present paper is to extend this spatial approach by using a probabilistic voting model in place of the classic median-voter framework. This type of model (see, for example, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , Enelow and Hinich (1989) , Grossman and Helpman (1996) , Persson and Tabellini (Ch. 3, 2000) ) offers a more-realistic picture of the voting process, overturning some unrealistic implications of the median-voter model.
In that model, a candidate has an incentive to chose a position just on the median side of her opponent's position, 2 thereby capturing all the votes on that side of the opponent and winning the election. Under the probabilistic voting model, however, individual vote outcomes are stochastic due to the presence of a random, idiosyncratic "valence" effect (which shifts a candidate's attractiveness) along with other shocks that affect all voters in common. Since a voter's preferred policy position is then not a perfect indicator of how he will vote, locating adjacent to the opponent is not the right strategy for a candidate. Under the version of the model used in this paper, a candidate's best strategy would be to locate at the median of the voters' preferred positions regardless of the opponent's location, avoiding a potential vote loss from a more-extreme position. With the other candidate making the same choice, the equilibrium candidate positions would then have the same common median location as in the median-voter model. But the mechanics of the models are different, and once negative and positive campaign spending are introduced, an entirely new analysis is needed. Thus, an exploration of negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model is a worthwhile undertaking that can advance our understanding of the behavior of political candidates.
The analysis considers two different models of negative campaigning distinguished by the roles of positive spending. In the first model, which follows the setup of Harrington and Hess (1996, hereafter HH) , both positive and negative spending shift the candidates' positions, as perceived by the voters. More specifically, a candidate's positive spending moves her perceived position toward the median while her negative spending moves the perceived position of the opponent away from the median. A candidate's positive spending thus makes her look more centrist while negative spending makes her opponent look more extreme. In the second model, negative spending plays the same role as in the first model, but positive spending affects the perceived valences of the candidates, shifting the distribution of the random valence variable that captures the relative attractiveness of the two candidates. Charkabarti's (2007) modification of the HH model is in a similar spirit, but the details are different.
In both models, the stated policy position of a candidate, perceptions of which are shifted by negative and positive spending, is also a choice variable, in contrast to the exogeneity of stated positions in the models of HH and Chakrabarti. Each candidate has an underlying belief or ideology, and the candidates are not purely office-driven, suffering utility losses when their stated positions diverge from these ideologies. The candidates are also constrained by fixed total campaign budgets, which are split between negative and positive spending. Taking her budget constraint into account, a candidate then has two choice variables: stated position and the level of negative campaign spending. These variables are set in Nash fashion to maximize a utility function that equals the probability of winning times the benefit of holding office minus the loss due to divergence from ideology. In addition to analyzing the full choice problem, the discussion also considers the simpler case where the candidates' stated positions are fixed rather than chosen, as in the previous papers. However, along with the application of the probabilistic voting model, the endogeneity of stated positions is a significant extension of the previous frameworks.
The main goal of the analysis is to draw connections between the levels of negative campaign spending and the parameters of the model. The budget levels are important parameters, and their impacts are mostly positive, as expected. The analysis also shows the effects of parameters that capture the disutility of divergence from ideology and the productivity of negative campaign spending, with the latter effect naturally positive. The most important results, however, concern the effect of a candidate's relative centrism on her level of negative spending.
When the stated policy positions are choice variables, centrism is captured by ideology, but when the stated positions are fixed, centrism is captured by the positions themselves. The main result of the paper is that, when centrism is asymmetric, the more-centrist candidate has the higher level of negative campaign spending.
This result, which holds regardless of whether stated positions are chosen or fixed, may at first seem counterintuitive: a centrist candidate might seem to have little incentive to make her less-centrist opponent seem even more extreme through negative spending. The explanation, however, involves the central feature of the probabilistic voting model, as developed in the current paper. In particular, a candidate's gain from becoming marginally more centrist diminishes as her perceived position moves toward the median. Conversely, the candidate's gain from her opponent becoming marginally more extreme (which equals the opponent's loss from this movement) becomes larger as the opponent's perceived position moves away from the median. Therefore, a centrist candidate has a small marginal gain from extra positive spending and relatively large marginal gain from extra negative spending, causing spending to shift in the negative direction until (as a result of diminishing returns) these gains are equated. Harrington and Hess (1996) show that the candidate with the higher valence (which is nonstochastic and common across voters) spends relatively less on negative campaigning than her lower-valence opponent. Although this conclusion at first appears unconnected to the result described above, the two findings are roughly consistent, as follows. Since the two candidates appeal equally to the decisive voter in the HH model, the higher-valence candidate's position is farther from the decisive voter's preferred position than is the opponent's. The higher-valence candidate is thus the more-extreme candidate, and her lower negative spending therefore matches the current result. However, given the probabilistic nature of the current model and the assumption that voter utility is linear rather than strictly convex in the position differences, the mechanisms underlying the results in the two papers are very different. Chakrabarti (2007) extends HH by assuming two types of negative spending: ideological spending that shifts the opponent's policy position away from the median and valence spending that reduces the opponent's valence index. Chakrabarti's model is thus similar to the second model in the current paper, except that valence spending has a negative rather than positive effect (a difference that is inessential). His main result is that the higher-valence candidate (who is less centrist from above) engages in valence-shifting spending, which corresponds to positive spending in the current model. The lower-valence, more-centrist candidate focuses on negative, position-shifting spending. Therefore, Chakrabarti's results match the current findings, although the underlying mechanisms are different.
In other work, Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) and Polborn and Yi (2006) Lau and Rovner (2009) . Some papers ask whether negative campaigning "demobilizes" the electorate, disenchanting voters and thus reducing turnout. This view was advanced by Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon and Valentino (1994) but questioned by Wattenberg and Brians (1999) and others. The studies in this literature most directly related to the current paper measure the determinants of negative campaigning. These papers include Damore (2002) , Haynes and Rhine (1998) , Kahn (1993) , Lau and Pomper (2001) , Proctor, Peterson and Djupe (2005) , and Schenck-Hamlin and Haase (1994), among others. Relying on various types data on campaign negativism, the studies focus on potential causal factors such as the support difference between candidates, presence of an incumbent, party affiliation, gender, and proximity to the election date. However, none of their findings are directly relevant to the current paper's main prediction regarding the link between centrism and negativity.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the probabilistic voting model, developing it using the perceived policy positions of the candidates without specifying how they are determined. Sections 3 and 4 present the two versions of the model, which make different assumptions about the links between perceived positions and the levels of campaign spending. Section 5 offers conclusions.
A Model of Probabilistic Voting
The model has a continuum of voters with unit mass and two candidates, 1 and 2. Voters differ in their ideology, x, which is distributed over the support [0, 1] according to the cumulative distribution function F (x), with f(x) = F (x). For notational simplicity, f(x) is assumed symmetric and unimodal. The mean and the median of x are thus the same and equal to 1/2, with F (1/2) = 1/2. Let Z i denote the policy position of candidate i, as perceived by voters, and assume that
(1)
Voters thus perceive candidate 1 as liberal and candidate 2 as conservative. Further foundations for (1) will be provided below. For later use, observe that the inequalities in (1), along with F (1/2) = 1/2, imply
As will be discussed in the subsequent sections, Z i depends on the stated policy position of candidate i and the campaign spending of both candidates. This section, however, derives the probability of a candidate winning the election regardless of how Z i is determined, a probability that plays a key role in the analysis. The valence measure thus has a common distribution centered at zero for all voters, implying that the measure is uncorrelated with a voter's ideology x. While this assumption could be relaxed by allowing β to be a function of x (so that the variance of v x is voter-specific), altering the assumption that the distribution is centered at zero for all voters would make the analysis intractable. This type of probabilistic voting model has been used in the political-economy literature (for example, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , Enelow and Hinich (1989) , Grossman and Helpman (1996) , Persson and Tabellini (Ch. 3, 2000) ).
To calculate the probability that candidate i wins, consider voters' decisions. Voter x votes
where voter is assumed to vote for candidate 1 if indifferent between the two candidates. The inequality in (3) depends on the voter's identity x, and three cases are considered. For x < Z 1 ,
where 1/2β is the density
In an analogous manner, for x ≥ Z 2 , the probability that voter x votes for candidate 1 is
The expected number of votes received by candidate 1 is computed by weighting the probabilities in (4)-(6) by the numbers of voters for each case, which equal F (Z 1 ), F (Z 2 ) − F (Z 1 ), and 1 − F (Z 2 ), respectively, and summing. The result is
Integrating the last term in (7) by parts, 4 substituting the result, and simplifying, (7) reduces to
The probability that candidate 1 wins the election is the probability that his number of supporters, given by (8), exceeds 1/2, or the probability that s > Z 1 − Z 2 + 2
This probability is α k 1 2α ds, where 1/2α is the density of s. Evaluating this integral, candidate 1's probability of winning is then
Candidate 2's probability of winning is π 2 = 1 − π 1 .
Intuitively, ∂π 1 /∂Z 1 = 1−2F (Z 1 ) > 0 by (2), so that the probability of candidate 1 winning increases as her position moves closer to the median. Analogously,
Obviously, the effects of Z 1 and Z 2 on π 2 are the opposite of those on π 1 . Therefore, when Z's are chosen directly, Z 1 and Z 2 in the Nash equilibrium are both set at the median preferred policy position of voters, as noted in the introduction.
Note that, underlying these choices, is the following sequence of events. First, the candidates choose their Z's, with an understanding of the random nature of the voting process.
Then, the random process generates realized values of the valence variables v x for all voters and a value of the common random shock s. Votes are then cast, and a winner is determined.
The Choice of Position-Shifting Campaign Spending

The model and first-order conditions
Let X i denote the stated policy position of candidate i. Without loss of generality, assume 0 < X 1 < X 2 < 1, so that candidate 1 is again liberal and candidate 2 conservative. Voters imperfectly observe X i , with campaign spending influencing the perceived positions of the candidates. Letting P i and N i denote the positive and negative campaign spending of candidate i, the voter-perceived positions of the candidates are given by
where h > 0, h < 0, h(0) = 0 and λ > 0. 5 Thus, as in Harrington and Hess (1996) Candidate i has a campaign budget, E i , to be allocated between N i and P i . To avoid uninteresting and unrealistic cases, assume that (0). (12) The inequalities in (12) imply that Z 1 < 1/2 < Z 2 , as in (1), and thus yield (2) for all combinations of (N 1 , P 1 , N 2 , P 2 ). Voters then perceive candidate 1 to be liberal, with Z 1 < 1/2, and candidate 2 to be conservative, with Z 2 > 1/2, regardless of the levels of campaign spending.
Candidate i's utility reflects the benefit from winning the election, given by the win probability π i times a value R, which captures the benefits or "rent" from holding office (assumed for simplicity to be the same for both candidates). Subtracted from this gain is the candidate's loss from stating a policy position X i that diverges from her own ideology. This loss is represented as γ(X i − B i ) 2 , where B i gives i's ideology (or "beliefs") and γ > 0 captures the sensitivity of utility to divergence from ideology. Candidates i's utility is thus written
and after substituting (10) and (11) into the π 1 expression from (9), candidate 1's utility is written as
Candidate 2's utility is given by (13) with the first plus sign replaced by a minus sign and with γ(X 2 − B 2 ) 2 replacing the last expression.
Candidate i chooses her stated policy position X i and campaign spending levels, P i and N i , to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint P i = E i − N i . Letting superscripts denote partial derivatives, candidate 1's first-order conditions are
where F i ≡ F (Z i ), means "proportional to," and µ = 4αγ/R. Analogously, the conditions for candidate 2 are
It is assumed that these conditions generate interior solutions for all the choice variables.
The interpretations of the conditions are straightforward. In choosing her policy position X 1 , candidate 1 balances the benefit of increasing her winning probability (first term in (14)) and the cost of deviating from her ideology (second term). An increase in negative spending N 1 moves candidate 2's perceived position away from the center (first term in (15)), increasing the probability of candidate 1 winning. But the associated decrease in positive spending P 1 moves candidate 1's perceived position away from the center (second term in (15)), decreasing the probability of winning. These two effects are balanced in choosing N 1 . Analogous interpretations apply to candidate 2.
The second-order conditions for candidate 1 include
where f i ≡ f(Z i ). While condition (18) holds, (19) is not necessarily satisfied since the term 2f 2 (λh (N 1 )) 2 is positive while all other terms are negative. However, since the first and third terms in (19) cancel at a symmetric equilibrium (where f 2 = f 1 ), leaving only negative terms, the condition is satisfied at such an equilibrium. It can be shown, though, that (19) holds in general if the function h satisfies h /h ≤ −h /h . 7 If h is a power function, this condition requires that the positive exponent is no larger than 1/2. The additional second-order condition, positivity of the Hessian determinant of U 1 , is not ensured (even under symmetry) and must be assumed (as seen in the appendix, the U X 1 N 1 1 term in the determinant is always positive). Note that for analysis of the fixed-X case, which is carried out in the next section, the second-order condition consists only of (19). For this case, the condition is satisfied at a symmetric equilibrium and is satisfied globally if the above sufficient condition holds.
Analysis with fixed X's
To focus on the choice of campaign spending in a simple manner, this section assumes that the policy positions X 1 and X 2 are fixed. Only the first-order conditions (15) and (17) are then relevant, and combining these conditions and eliminating the P 's yields
Suppose that the candidates' campaign budgets are equal (with E 1 = E 2 = E) and that the X's are symmetric around the median policy position, with X 1 = 1 − X 2 . Then (20) is satisfied by a symmetric outcome, where N 1 = N 2 = N, although asymmetric equilibria cannot be ruled out despite the symmetry of the E's and X's. In this symmetric equilibrium, (10) and (11), so that the first ratio in (20) equals 1, with the second and third ratios equalling 1 as well. Therefore, the N solution is given by
Inspection of (21) shows that N > (<) E/2 holds as λ > (<) 1, and more generally, the inequality ∂N/∂λ > 0 is easily established by differentiating (21). In addition, the common N is independent of the X's, and differentiation of (21) shows that ∂N/∂E > 0. 8
The analysis now turns to a comparative-static analysis of the fixed-X case. To compute the comparative-static derivatives, the first-order conditions for the N's ( (15) and (17)) are totally differentiated. Since the second-order condition (19) and the corresponding condition for candidate 2 are satisfied at a symmetric equilibrium, comparative-static effects at such an equilibrium are thus the focus, with parameter changes then shifting the outcome to a nearby asymmetric equilibrium. However, if the second-order conditions hold globally, as would be the case if h /h < −h /h , then the results hold globally as well.
The positive effect of λ on negative spending in a symmetric equilibrium was just established in the discussion of (21). Additional results, which are established in the appendix, show the effect of campaign budgets on the spending levels:
Therefore, negative spending is increasing in the size of candidate's own budget and decreasing in the size of her opponent's budget. Appraising the effect of E i on own positive spending requires knowledge of the magnitude of the derivative ∂N i /∂E i relative to 1, given
While this relationship is ambiguous, making ∂P i /∂E i ambiguous, an increase in the opponent's budget raises positive spending since
To use (22) to make a simpler statement, suppose X 1 = 1 − X 2 and E 1 = E 2 = E, and let the symmetric equilibrium that exists under these conditions be the starting point. Then, suppose E 1 rises and E 2 falls, so that E 1 > E 2 . Using (22), the rise in E 1 and drop in E 2 cause N 1 to rise and N 2 to fall, so that N 1 > N 2 . 9 The following natural conclusion can then be stated:
Proposition 1. In the vicinity of a symmetric equilibrium where stated positions are fixed, the candidate with the larger budget has the higher level of negative campaign spending.
The exogenous stated positions of the candidates also affect spending choices. The ap-pendix establishes the following results:
Therefore, candidate 1's negative spending rises when X 1 increases and falls when X 2 decreases.
Candidate 2's negative spending rises when X 2 decreases and falls when X 1 increases.
To use (22) to make a simpler statement, again suppose that X 1 = 1−X 2 and E 1 = E 2 = E, and let the symmetric equilibrium be the starting point. Then, suppose X 1 rises and X 2 rises as well, so that, starting from equal degrees of centrism, candidate 1 becomes relatively more centrist (with X 1 > 1 − X 2 ). Using (23), the rise in X 1 causes N 1 to increase and N 2 to fall, while the rise in X 2 has the same effects, leading to N 1 > N 2 . 10 Summarizing yields Proposition 2. In the vicinity of a symmetric equilibrium where stated positions are fixed, the more-centrist candidate has the higher level of negative campaign spending.
This result may at first seem counterintuitive because a relatively extreme stated position for the opponent might appear to reduce, rather than increase, the incentive for the more-centrist candidate to make her opponent's perceived position more extreme via negative spending. Conversely, a relatively more-centrist position for the opponent might appear to increase, rather than reduce, the incentive for the more-extreme candidate to make her opponent's perceived position more extreme via negative spending.
To resolve these puzzles, note that the candidate 1's utility gain from shifting her own position rightward via positive spending, which is proportional to 1 − 2F (Z 1 ), is smaller the larger is Z 1 (and thus X 1 ), capturing the diminishing benefits of moving toward the median preferred position among voters. As a result, the loss from diverting funds from positive to negative spending is smaller the larger is X 1 . Similarly, the utility gain from shifting the opponent's position away from the median via negative spending, which equals the opponent's loss from this shift, is proportional to 2F (Z 2 ) − 1. This gain is larger the larger is Z 2 (and thus X 2 ). Therefore, candidate 1's negative spending is encouraged by larger values of both X 1 and X 2 .
Since the discussion surrounding (21) established that symmetric increases in the E's raise the symmetric N, it follows that the positive own budget effect in (22) is absolutely larger than the negative opponent's budget effect (when evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium). In addition, recalling that symmetric changes in centrism have no effect on the N's, it follows that the own X effect in (23) is exactly cancelled by the opponent's X effect. Therefore, even though a shift toward asymmetric degrees of centrism changes the N's, symmetric changes in the X's have no effect.
Analysis with chosen X's: The λ = 1 case
The analysis now turns to the case where the X's as well as the N's are decision variables for the candidates. Given (2) and first-order conditions (14) and (16), the chosen policy positions satisfy
Intuitively, candidate 1 chooses a policy position closer to the center than her ideology in order to increase the winning probability, taking account of the disutility of diverging from that ideology, and candidate 2 does the same. The set of equalities in (20) is expanded to include a fourth ratio, (X 1 − B 1 )/(B 2 − X 2 ).
When the X's are chosen, comparative-static analysis is unfortunately infeasible given the number and complexity of the equilibrium conditions, (14)-(17). However, partial results for the case where λ = 1 can be established using an approach that does not rely on comparative statics. Even though comparative-static calculations are not used, the second-order conditions for the problem nevertheless must be satisfied. But the ambiguity of the sign of the Hessian determinant means that satisfaction is not guaranteed, even under symmetry or the previous sufficient condition. Therefore, the required positivity of the Hessian determinant is assumed.
The non-comparative-static approach relies on the following result:
Lemma. If E 1 = E 2 = E, so that campaign budgets are equal, and λ = 1, then the equalities N 1 = P 2 and N 2 = P 1 hold.
To establish the lemma, assume that λ = 1 and that, contrary to the claim, N 1 < P 2 holds, which implies N 1 < E − N 2 and hence that N 2 < E − N 1 = P 1 . Then h (N 1 ) > h (P 2 ) and h (P 1 ) < h (N 2 ), so that h (N 1 )/h (P 1 ) > h (P 2 )/h (N 2 ) holds, violating (20). The case where N 1 > P 2 can be ruled out in parallel fashion. 11
The lemma can be used to draw a connection between ideologies and stated positions:
Proposition 3. If λ = 1 and the campaign budgets are equal, then the candidate with the more-centrist ideology chooses the more-centrist stated position.
This result is established by first noting from (10) that Z 1 = X 1 and 1 − Z 2 = 1 − X 2 hold when λ = 1 because the equalities N 1 = P 2 and N 2 = P 1 are then satisfied by the lemma.
Next, suppose that B 1 > 1 − B 2 holds but that X 1 ≤ 1 − X 2 also holds, contradicting the conclusion of the proposition. Then the first ratio in (20) exceeds 1, but the new fourth ratio, which can be written (
, is less than 1, a contradiction that establishes the first part of the proposition. The second part follows by the same argument.
Proposition 3 generates an additional conclusion analogous to Proposition 2:
Proposition 4. If λ = 1 and the campaign budgets are equal, then the candidate with the more-centrist ideology has the higher level of negative campaign spending.
This result is established by noting that, since Z 1 = X 1 > 1 − X 2 = 1 − Z 2 holds when B 1 > 1 − B 2 by Proposition 3 and the lemma, the first ratio in (20) is less than one. As a result, h (N 1 )/h (E − N 1 ) < 1 and h (E − N 2 )/h (N 2 ) < 1 must hold, and these inequalities
It is interesting to note that, although this non-comparative-static approach allows a connection to be drawn between negative spending and ideologies, it cannot be used to establish an analog to Proposition 1, which relates negative spending to budgets, for the case where the X's are chosen. 13
Positive (Negative) Spending Shifts Valence (Position)
4.1. The model and first-order conditions Instead of following Harrington and Hess (1996) by assuming that positive and negative campaign spending both shift the perceived positions of the candidates, suppose that these expenditures play different roles. Specifically, suppose that a candidate's positive campaign spending is designed to shift her own valence in a favorable direction, while her negative spending is meant to shift her opponent's position toward a more-extreme location. With positive spending not affecting the Z's, (10) and (11) become
As for the effect of valence-shifting positive spending, such spending is assumed to shift the mean of the valence distribution from section 2. In particular, rather than assuming that the valence term v x is uniformly distributed over the interval [−β, β] , the support of the distribution is assumed to be [−β + G, β + G], where G captures the effect of positive campaigning (the density thus remains 1/β). G depends on positive campaign spending levels via the relationship
where g > 0 and g < 0. Thus, recalling that a large value of v x favors candidate 1, an increase in 1's positive spending shifts the valence distribution in her favor (to the right) whereas an increase in candidate 2's spending shifts it in her favor (to the left). Note that g is a different function from h given the different targets of the spending (valence vs. position). 14 To see the effect of this modification on the candidates' objective functions, note that the upper limit of integration in (4) is replaced by β + G = β + g(P 1 ) − g(P 2 ). As a result, the expression on the right-hand side of the equation is replaced by Z 1 − Z 2 + g(P 1 ) − g(P 2 ) + s.
Since the same replacement occurs in (4) and (5), s is effectively replaced by g(P 1 ) − g(P 2 ) + s wherever it appears. The integration leading to (9) proceeds as before, leading to the following expression for candidate 1's probability of winning the election:
Substituting for the Z's from (25), and subtracting the disutility of divergence from beliefs, candidate 1's utility function is written
Relative to the utility function (13) from the model of section 3, (28) differs in the absence of positive spending terms in the integral's limits of integration, a consequence of the assumption that positive spending does not affect the candidates' positions, altering only valence.
As before, candidate 2's probability of winning the election is one minus the expression in (27) . As a result, her objective function is given by (28) with the first plus sign replaced by a minus sign, and with the last term replaced by −γ(X 2 − B 2 ) 2 .
Substituting P i = E i − N i in the two objection functions, i = 1, 2, first-order conditions are computed, again assuming Nash behavior on the part of the candidates. Treating both N i and X i , i = 1, 2, as decision variables, the first-order conditions for candidate 1 are
Note that (29) is the same as (14) but that (30) differs from (15) in the absence of the (1− 2F 1 ) factor multiplying the positive spending derivative g (P 1 ) (the F arguments, of course, differ as well). Analogously, the first-order conditions for candidate 2 are
The interpretation of these conditions is similar to that in the previous model.
The second-order conditions for candidate 1 are (18) and
where the 1 subscripts on g and h indicate evaluation at candidate 1's values. As before, (33) contains both positive and negative terms, and its satisfaction must be assumed (unlike before, symmetry is of no help). As before, though, a condition ensuring satisfaction of (33) is h /h ≤ −h /h (which holds if h is a power function with exponent no larger than 1/2). In addition, since U X 1 N 1 1 is now zero, positivity of the Hessian determinant of U 1 is guaranteed if (33) holds.
Basic condition
Rearranging (29)-(32) yields the following condition in the fixed-X case:
Therefore, rather than being separately equal to the ratios of spending derivatives, the lefthand expression in (34) equals the product of these ratios in the modified model. In the symmetric case, with equal E's and symmetric X's, (34) is satisfied by a symmetric outcome, with N 1 = N 2 . However, asymmetric equilibria cannot be ruled out.
Comparative-static analysis
Comparative-static analysis with the X's fixed is simpler than in the previous model because the absence of P 2 from the Z 2 argument of 2F 2 − 1 in (30) means that the equation involves only N 1 and the exogenous quantities X 2 and E 1 (and similarly for (32)). Since U N 1 z 1 is positive for z = X 2 , E 1 , λ, the derivatives ∂N 1 /∂z = −U N 1 z 1 /U N 1 N 1 1 are positive given (33), so that
with the effects on N 2 (from (32)) given by reversing the indexes.
Although symmetry has not been required to sign these derivatives, suppose nevertheless that the starting point is a symmetric equilibrium and that E 1 increases and E 2 decreases.
From (35), the first change raises N 1 while having no effect on N 2 , while the second change reduces N 2 and has no effect on N 1 . Thus, N 1 > N 2 holds after the change, yielding an analog to Proposition 1 for the modified model. Similarly, consider the effect of asymmetric stated positions, starting at a symmetric equilibrium and then raising both X 1 and X 2 . The second change raises N 1 from (35) while having no effect on N 2 , while the first change reduces N 2 while having no effect on N 1 , again yielding N 1 > N 2 and establishing an analog to Proposition 2 for the modified model. Using (30) and (31),
so that
Eliminating X 2 in (30) using (37), the equation can be rewritten as
a condition that determines N 1 as a function of parameters. Differentiating (38) with respect to N 1 yields
using the second-order condition (33) (the negative second term captures the effect that operates through the new ratio expression in the argument of F ).
Since it easily seen that Γ E 1 , Γ B 2 , Γ µ , Γ λ > 0 hold, 15 while the effects of other parameters on Γ are zero, the signs of the comparative-static derivatives
are all positive:
Note that the relevant parts of (40) match (35) with the X's replaced by B's. A new effect, however, operates through the parameter µ, with (40) showing that an increase in µ raises negative spending. Recalling that µ = 4αγ/R, a higher µ can be caused by an increase in the disutility of divergence from ideology (γ), a decrease in the benefits of holding office (R), or an increase in the dispersion of the common electoral shock (α). The implication is that any of these changes leads to an increase in negative spending. 16
Reversing the second inequality in (40), the negative-spending effects for candidate 2 are
Using (37) and the expressions for the derivatives in (40), the appendix establishes 17
Reversing the last sign in (42), the stated-position effects for candidate 1 are:
Therefore, stated positions become more extreme (moving closer to ideologies) as µ increases, a change that is especially transparent when the higher µ comes from a greater disutility of divergence from ideology (γ). When ideologies change, stated positions shift in the same direction, but the shift is smaller.
These results can be used to draw conclusions about the effect of asymmetric conditions like those in Propositions 1, 2 and 4 by repeating the arguments following (35). However, these conclusions differ in that the B's are held fixed rather than the X's. Because a budget increase raises own negative spending while not affecting that of the opponent from (40) and (41), an analog to Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 5. In the modified model with all choices endogenous, if ideologies are symmetric, then the candidate with the larger budget has the higher level of negative campaign spending.
Because (40) and (41) show that a more-centrist ideology for the opponent reduces own negative spending while own-ideology has no effect, an analog to Proposition 2 follows: Proposition 6. In the modified model with all choices endogenous, if budgets are equal, then the candidate with the more-centrist ideology has the higher level of negative campaign spending.
The effect of symmetric changes in ideologies and budgets can be appraised, paralleling the discussion following (21) for the fixed-X version of the first model. Starting at a symmetric equilibrium, common increases in the E's raise negative spending for both candidates given (40) and (41), matching the earlier conclusion. However, while negative spending was independent of positions in the symmetric fixed-X version of the first model, a different conclusion applies for the modified model. Starting at a symmetric equilibrium, a common movement of the B's toward the center reduces negative spending for both candidates, as can be seen from (40) and (41).
Summary
The paper's results are summarized in Table 1 , which shows the effects of the parameters on negative campaign spending for both versions of the model. Budget effects are mostly as expected, although the negative effect of the opponent's budget in the fixed-X version of the first model is not predictable. The positive impacts of the productivity of negative spending are also natural, although the positive effect of µ in the modified model is again unpredictable.
The most important results of the paper concern the effects of relative centrism on negative campaign spending. Although the table entries for centrism's effects are varied, they all show that relative centrism raises a candidate's negative spending compared to her opponent's. This effect arises through the reverse effects of own and opponent centrism in the fixed-X version of the first model, as seen in the first column of Table 1 . When X is chosen in that model, comparative-static results are unavailable but Proposition 4 establishes the same conclusion in a different fashion, as seen in the second column. In the modified model, the relativecentrism effect arises entirely through the opponent, with greater centrism for the opponent (which reduces relative own-centrism) lowering own negative spending, as seen in the last two columns of the table.
Conclusion
This paper has extended the small existing theoretical literature on negative campaigning, building on work by Harrington and Hess (1996) . While their analysis explores the determinants of negative campaign spending using a classic spatial voting model, this paper relies instead on a probabilistic voting model, extending the use of this popular model to a new setting. By using two different versions of the model based on different assumptions on the targeting of campaign spending, the paper generates a host of results. However, the main lesson, which emerges in fairly robust fashion regardless of specific assumptions, is that negative campaign spending is higher for the relatively more-centrist candidate. The more-extreme candidate in the electoral contest devotes, by contrast, comparatively more of her funds to positive campaign spending. This result, which at first appears unrelated to the main findings of Harrington and Hess (1996) and Chakrabarti's (2007) 
Proof of Proposition 1
The relevant derivatives of the expressions in the first-order conditions (15) and (17) are given by
In using Cramer's rule to compute comparative-static derivatives, the sign of the determinant
are negative at the symmetric equilibrium and since U N 1 N 2 1 and U N 2 N 1 2 are both zero under symmetry (see above), H > 0 holds. Note that if the sufficient condition discussed in the text holds, so that the second derivatives are always negative, then H > 0 is also satisfied given that the cross partial derivatives have opposite signs away from a symmetric equilibrium, leading to full satisfaction of the second-order conditions.
Using H > 0,
− 2f 1 (h (P 1 )) 2 [(2F 2 − 1)h (P 2 ) + (1 − 2F 1 )λh (N 2 )]} > 0.
The second equality uses the derivative expressions above along with (20) . The inequality in (a1) follows because U N 2 N 2 2 < 0 holds and because 2F 2 − 1 > 0 and 1 − 2F 1 > 0.
Analogously,
2F 1 ]f 2 λh (N 1 )h (P 2 )h (P 2 ) + [2F 2 − 1]f 1 h (P 1 )λh (N 2 )λh (N 1 )} < 0.
By switching the candidate index and budget indices, it is easy to verify that
Proof of Proposition 2
and
By switching the candidate and budget indices, it is easy to verify that
Derivation of (42) Differentiating (37) with respect to B 2 yields
where Ω = g 1 h 1 + g 1 h 1 µλ(h 1 ) 2 < 0.
Substituting for ∂N 1 /∂B 2 , (a1) reduces to
Note that (a9), while positive, is also less than one. Differentiating (37) with respect to µ yields ∂X 2 ∂µ = g 1 µ 2 λh 1 + Ω ∂N 1 ∂µ Footnotes * We thank Ami Glazer for helpful commments, although any shortcomings in the paper are our responsibility.
1 Levitt (1994) , Gerber (1998) , Erickson and Palfrey (2000) , and Franz and Ridout (2007) study the effects of campaign spending on election outcomes. Cox and Munger (1989) , Endersby et al. (2002) , and Herrera et al. (2008) consider the effects of campaign spending on voter participation. Sahuguet and Persico (2006) , Milligan and Rekkas (2008) , Cotton (2009) , and Pastine and Pastine (2012) analyze the effect of campaign spending limits.
2 Voters are designated as males and candidates as females.
3 Konrad (2004) develops a model of "inverse campaigning," in which a candidate informs voters that a small subset of individuals will benefit from an opponent's proposal, which the candidate opposes. This information may shift benefit perceptions among the remaining voters, increasing overall support for the candidate.
4 Integrating by parts, the last term becomes
5 It is also assumed that the limit of h as its argument approaches zero is infinity, an Inada condition that ensures interior solutions.
6 For example, during the 2012 U.S. presidential-election campaign, the Obama campaign portrayed Mr. Romney as an extremely conservative candidate, exemplified by the 47% remark. Such a portrayal is viewed as negative spending in the sense that it makes the conservative candidate look more conservative. At the same time, the Obama campaign emphasized that Mr. Obama has a strong record of national security, exemplified by the assasination of Osama Bin Laden, and such emphasis is viewed as positive spending that moves the liberal candidate toward the center.
